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The Soviet Union and
International Terrorism*
JOHN F. MURPHYt
DONALD R. BRADYt

I. Introduction
Normally subject to "benign neglect" in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, international terrorism has suddenly and dramatically become the
focus of intense scrutiny. In the wake of the hostages' release after 444 days
of captivity in Iran, President Reagan has warned of swift and effective
retribution against future incidents involving terrorism, I and Secretary of
State Alexander Haig has charged that the Soviet Union is seeking to "foster, support and expand" terrorist activities around the world, and is "training, funding and equipping the forces of terrorism." 2 Secretary Haig has
also stated that "international terrorism will take the place of human rights
'3
in our concern because it is the ultimate of [sic] abuse of human rights."
Prior to Secretary Haig's remarks, others had alleged that the Soviet
4
Union was engaging in widespread support of international terrorism.
According to newspaper reports appearing shortly after the Secretary's
remarks, however, the Department of State and U.S. intelligence agencies
were able to come up with little hard evidence to back up his charges. 5 To
some this merely reflected the low level to which U.S. intelligence agencies'
capabilities had fallen after earlier revelations of unsavory domestic and
international operations. The data are available, such critics claim, in the
files of Western European intelligence agencies, but these agencies are
reluctant to disclose it because this would risk confrontation with the Soviet
*The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect
those of the Naval War College.

tCharles H. Stockton Professor of International Law, Naval War College. Professor of
Law, University of Kansas (on leave 1980-81).
tLieutenant Commander, United States Navy.
'N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1981, at B13, col. 3.
1d, Jan. 29, 1981, at AI0, col. I.
3
1d

'See especially Moss, Terror. A Soviet Export, N.Y. Times Magazine, Nov. 2, 1980, at 42.
'N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1981, at A3, col. 4; Washington Post, Feb. 7, 1981, at AI0, col. 1.
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Union, as well as with Arab countries in the Middle East. 6 An American
journalist, Claire Sterling, claims to have this data, and has at this writing
published an article based on it and adapted from a soon-to-be published
7
book.
Future disclosures of data may clarify the situation. In the meantime, we
will attempt in this article to evaluate the attitude and practice of the Soviet
Union toward international terrorism, insofar as they may be gleaned from
available evidence. But first, we must turn to the difficult task of attempting
to define "international terrorism."
II. International Terrorism:
A Definitional Quagmire
In any discussion of international terrorism, one has to deal with the
problem of its definition. Or, rather, one has to attempt to deal with the
problem of its definition, because this is a problem that neither statesmen
nor scholars have resolved to widespread satisfaction. There are, indeed,
many who believe that the term is indefinable and ought to be dropped-at
least for purposes of analysis and efforts to combat those acts loosely
termed international terrorism. 8 Nonetheless, despite its deficiencies, the
term "international terrorism" appears to be here to stay. As such, it has
been used--depending upon the particular perception-to cover three
categories:
1. State Terrorism. This category comprises the use of terror by governments, including, for example, torture, genocide, and the assassination of
political enemies abroad by the use of diplomats or other persons enjoying
special status by virtue of their governmental functions. The international
dimension is supplied by the fact that these activities violate internationally
recognized norms of human rights. Indeed, another, and most commentators believe preferable, approach to this problem is to view it as a matter
covered by international human rights law.
2. Terrorism in Armed Conflict. Included in this category are acts
inflicting terror in the context of "armed conflict" covered by the law of
war. Examples would include the killing of defenseless prisoners of war
and the wanton slaughter of civilian noncombatants.
3. International Terrorism by Private Individuals. A working (although
by no means uniformly agreed upon) definition of this category would be
"the threat or use of violence by private persons for political ends, where
the conduct itself or its political objectives, or both, are international in
'Washington Post, Feb. 7, 1981, at A10, col. 1.
'Sterling, Terrorism Tracing the InternationalNetwork, N.Y. Times Magazine, March 1,
1981, at 16, adapted from Ms. Sterling's book, The TerrorNetwork, to be published in April by
Reader's Digest Press/Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
'See, e.g., Baxter, A Skeptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism, 7 AKRON L. REV. 380
(1974).
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scope." 9 Another working definition might be Professor Paust's description
of terrorism as "the purposive use of violence or the threat of violence by
the perpetrator(s) against an instrumental target in order to communicate to
a primary target a threat of future violence so as to coerce the primary
target into behavior or attitudes through intense fear or anxiety in connection with a demanded (political) outcome."' 0 As an example where the
instrumental and primary targets might be the same person or group of
persons Paust cites an attack on a military headquarters in order to instill
terror or intense anxiety in the military elite of that headquarters.I' He
notes further that "the instrumental target need not be a person since
attacks on power stations can produce a terror outcome in the civilian population of the community dependent upon the station for electricity."1 2 So
defined, international terrorism might include-assuming the presence of a
terror outcome, a political goal, and an international dimension-the explosion of bombs in the market place, the taking of hostages, attacks on international business persons and diplomats, the hijacking of airplanes, the
possible use of nuclear materials or chemical and biological weapons, and
attacks on energy resources such as pipelines, off-shore oil rigs, and tankers
carrying oil or natural gas.
These categories are not, of course, mutually exclusive, and the line
between them may be difficult to draw. For example, it may be difficult to
determine whether a particular terrorist act has been committed by a private individual acting on his own or by one serving at the direction of a
government. Similar difficulties may arise in determining whether a situation should be characterized as an "armed conflict" subject to the law of
war. Further, acts of state terrorism may create a political, economic or
social milieu that precipitates acts of individual terrorism. Despite such
complexities of compartmentalization, these categories are useful for present purposes, and we will employ them in our analysis of Soviet practices
regarding international terrorism.
III. The Soviet Union and State Terrorism
Historically, the Soviet Union presents the paradigmatic case of state terrorism. The use of systematic government terror to torture or kill enemies
of the communist regime in Russia was first installed by Lenin' 3 and utilized most extensively by Stalin as documented in Alexander Solzhenitsyn's
The Gulag Archipelago. With Stalin's death and the disclosure of Stalin's
crimes by Nikita Khrushchev before the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956,
9

See LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM XV (A.E. Evans & J.F. Murphy, eds.

1978).
'"Jordan J. Paust, Terrorism and the InternationalLaw of War, 64 MILITARY L. REV. 1, 3-4
(1974).
1'Id
2
' 1d
"A. PARRY, TERRORISM FROM ROBESPIERRE TO ARAFAT 131 (1976).
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the brutality of Soviet repression of its opponents eased considerably,
although egregious violations of fundamental human rights still occur on a
regular basis. Nonetheless, it is doubtful whether the brutality of current
Soviet state terror matches that employed by a number of other statesincluding some oriented toward the West, such as El Salvador' 4 and

Guatemala. 15
Several states enjoying the strong support of the Soviet Union, such as
Libya, Iraq, and Syria, have recently sponsored the assassination of their
enemies abroad, sometimes under the cover of diplomacy. 16 There is no
evidence, however, that the Soviet Union encouraged these states in these
assassinations or that it trained the assassins. Rather, these states appear to
have acted alone, pursuing their own goals and interests.
The main thrust of recent charges, of course, has related not to state terrorism but to terrorism in armed conflict and to private acts of international
terrorism. It is to the first of these that we turn in the next section.
IV. The Soviet Union and Terrorism
in Armed Conflict
One shocking example of Soviet terrorism in armed conflict has gone
largely unnoticed. According to reports, 17 the Soviet Union in its battles in
Afghanistan is ignoring all restraints on armed conflict placed by the law of
war and by humanitarian principles. There, both the Soviet Union and the
Afghan rebels have been fighting with no quarter asked or given. The Russians have reportedly bombed villages indiscriminately with no concern for
civilian casualties, dropped rebel prisoners from helicopters, and used lethal
chemicals against the guerrillas. All of these practices, of course, violate
applicable Hague Regulations and Geneva Conventions on the law of war,
as well as the 1977 Geneva Protocols not yet in force. For their part the
rebels allegedly torture, mutilate and sometimes skin alive the Russian
soldiers they capture.
There is no doubt that the Soviet Union is involved in sponsoring socalled wars of national liberation in many parts of the globe. Indeed, they
make no effort to hide the fact. 18 These insurgency groups at times engage
in terrorist activities. Some members-not all-of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) have done so, as have the former guerrillas in Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, the leftist guerrillas in El Salvador, the South West
People's Organization (SWAPO) in Southwest Africa or Namibia, and the
leftist rebels in Turkey, to name a few. There is evidence that the Soviet
4See T.D. Allman, Rising to Rebellion, Harper's, March 1981, at 31.
"See Power, Behind the Killings in Guatemala, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1981, at A19, col. 1.
"See J. de Vernisy, The New International Terrorism, World Press Review, Nov. 1980, at 23
"Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
"See N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1981, at A3, col. 4, referring to a diplomatic note from the Soviet
Union to the United States defending a Soviet right to assist national movements of
independence.

Soviet Union and InternationalTerrorism

Union has given military training to such groups as well as arms and
ammunition. There is little evidence that they were specially trained in or
encouraged to use terrorist techniques.'

9

The evidence regarding the PLO

20
indicated that their training has been in conventional military techniques.

To be sure, this support by the Soviet Union for insurgency movements
itself constitutes a blatant violation of fundamental norms of the United

Nations Charter, 2' and the Soviet Union should be held accountable for it.
There is also a basic question regarding the usefulness of terrorism to an
insurgency movement. Leninist strategies of insurgency place little emphasis on terror tactics or the provocation of government counterterror. 2 2 One
must remember that terror is the weapon of the weak and a two-edged
sword. If a primary goal of an insurgency movement is to "win the hearts

and minds of the people," terrorism may be counterproductive. This is
especially true if insurgency tactics result in the deaths of persons perceived
by the mass of the population to be innocent. This may allow the government in power to employ highly repressive counterterrorist tactics with the
approval of the majority of the population. This is what happened to the
Tupamaros in Uruguay2 3 and to the rebels against British authority in
Malaya. 24 There is also evidence that terrorist tactics in Northern Ireland
25
and England have undermined the Irish Republican Army (IRA) cause.

26
Terrorism directed against the shah's regime in Iran also had little effect.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union is one of the few states which have
expressly argued that prohibitions against-much less criminal sanctions

27
for-terrorist acts should not apply to wars of national liberation. It will

be remembered that the kidnapping and killing at Munich on September 6,
1972, of eleven Israeli Olympic competitors by Arab terrorists, as well as a
number of other spectacular acts of terrorism, resulted in the U.N. General
Assembly considering the problem of international terrorism and in the

introduction by the United States on September 25 of a Draft Convention
"N.Y. Times, id
N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1980, at Al, col. 3.
"The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Oct. 1970,
U.N.G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971),
which is generally regarded as an authoritative interpretation of the U.N. Charter, provides in
pertinent part:
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in
acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiesing in organized activities
within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in
the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.
"O'Neill, Insurgency.- A FrameworkforAnalysis, INSURGENCY IN THE MODERN WORLD 1,
27 (B. E. O'Neill, W. R. Heaton, & D. J. Alberts, eds. 1980).
"See MILLER, URBAN TERRORISM IN URUGUAY: THE TUPAMAROS, id., at 137.
2
"See, e.g., THOMPSON, DEFEATING COMMUNIST INSURGENCY (1966).
"IB.E.
O'Neill, W.R. Heaton, and D.J. Alberts, eds., supra, note 22, at 276-77.
26
1 d, at 277.
2"See U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, Observations of States Submitted in Accordance with General Assembly Resolution 3034 (XXVII), U.N. Doc. A/A.C. 160/1
and Adds. 1-5 (May-July 1973).
2
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for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism. 28 In introducing the Convention, and in subsequent debates on it, U.S.
representatives attempted to obviate the concern of some member states
that the Convention was directed against wars of national liberation. To
this end, they pointed out that the Convention was limited in its coverage to
"any person who unlawfully kills, causes serious bodily harm or kidnaps
another person. .

.," that

the act had to be committed or take effect outside

of the state against which the act was directed, unless such acts were knowingly directed against a nonnational of that state, and that the act must not
be committed either by or against a member of the armed forces of a state
in the course of military hostilities. Despite these efforts, many member
states opposed the U.S. initiative, viewing it as directed generally against
revolutionary movements. As a result, the General Assembly failed to take
any action on the U.S. Draft Convention. 29 The Soviet Union lobbied
intensively for this result.
V. The Soviet Union and Private Acts of
International Terrorism
There appears to be little hard evidence, at least at this writing, that the
Soviet Union is directly supporting such free-lance terrorists as the Red
Brigades in Italy, the Baader-Meinhoff gang and its successors in West Germany, the Japanese Red Army, or Armenians who assassinate Turkish diplomats. 30 Substantial evidence exists that Libya has sponsored a variety of
terrorist organizations, but it is not clear the extent to which Libya is acting
at Soviet direction. There is some evidence also that Czechoslovakia has
trained Italy's Red Brigades, that North Korea has trained Japanese Red
Army members, that Cuba has trained terrorists for action in Latin
America, and that South Yemen has trained a wide assortment of terrorists. 3' One may reasonably conclude that these states are not acting
wholly on their own initiative. Whether their activities constitute, as
asserted by Claire Sterling, 32 part of a "worldwide terror network aimed at
the destabilization of Western democratic society" and directed from Mos-

cow is more debatable.
By way of defense, the Soviet Union points to its strong support for international measures against aircraft hijacking and sabotage, 33 attacks on dip2

Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Ter-

rorism (Draft Convention to Prevent the Spread of Terrorist Violence), U.N .Doc. A/C6/L.

8502 (1972).
'For discussion, see Murphy, International Legal Controls of Terrorism. Performance and
Prospects, 63 ILL. BAR. J. 444 (1975); Franck & Lockwood, Preliminary Thoughts Toward an
International Convention on Terrorism, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 69 (1974).
"°See N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1981, at A3, col. 4. But f Sterling, supra, note 7.
"See especially Sterling, supra, note 7 and Moss, supra, note 4.
"Sterling, supra, note 7, at 19.
"The Soviet Union is a party to the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention), 22 U.S.T. 1641; T.I.A.S. No. 7192 and the 1971 Con-
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lomats, 34 and, most recently, hostage-taking. 35 With respect to aircraft
hijacking and attacks on diplomats, the Soviet Union has taken a strong
stand, since it has often itself been a victim of such actions; indeed, the
preSoviet Union has accused the United States of failing to take adequate
36
cautions to protect its diplomats in New York and Washington.
As to hostage-taking, the record of the Soviet Union is mixed. In 1976,

after Israel's raid at Entebbe, Uganda, to save Israelis held hostage there,
the Soviet Union supported a draft resolution introduced in the Security
Council by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that would have had
the Council condemn Israel's "flagrant violation of Uganda's sovereignty
and territorial integrity" and demand that Israel meet the just claims of

Uganda for full compensation for the damage inflicted on Uganda. 37 In the

Soviet view, individual acts of terrorism could never justify, under international law, an attack by one state against another. 38 The OAU resolution
was never brought to a vote, but the Council also failed to adopt, for want
of enough affirmative votes, a resolution that would, inter alia, have condemned hijacking of airplanes, called upon all states to take every necessary
measure to prevent and punish all such terrorist acts, and reaffirmed the
need to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states in
accordance with the United Nations Charter and international law.

More recently, the Soviet Union supported the 1979 U.N. International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. 39 However, its record con-

cerning the U.S. hostages in Iran is not wholly compatible with the terms of
the Convention. On the positive side, the Soviet Union voted for a U.N.
Security Council resolution 40 that called for the immediate release of the
hostages, and its judge on the International Court of Justice voted for a
Court interim order 4' and final judgment 42 calling for release. On the negative side, the Soviet Union vetoed a Security Council resolution 43 that
vention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal
Convention), 24 U.S.T. 564; T.I.A.S. No. 7570. The Soviet Union has also taken a hard-line
position regarding the extradition and punishment of aircraft hijackers. See Evans, Aircraft
andAviations
Facilities, A.E. Evans, & J.F. Murphy, supra, note 9, at 3.
34 The Soviet Union is a party to the 1974 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, 28 U.S.T.
1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532.
"The Soviet Union supported adoption of the 1979 International Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages, U.N. Doc. A/C 6/34/L. 23 (1979); G.A. Res. 34/146 (1979).
"See Murphy, Protected Persons and Diplomatic Facilities, A. E. Evans & J. F. Murphy,
supra, note 9, at 277, 291.
"See U.N. Monthly Chronicle 15-21, 67-76 (Aug-Sept. 1976) for a summary of the Security
Council's debate on Entebbe.
3Id, at 70.
"See supra, note 35.
"S.C. Res. 457 (1979), reproduced in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1641 (1979).
41 Interim Order, Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran,
reproducedin 19 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 139 (1979).
41Judgment, Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran,
reproduced in 19 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 553 (May 1980).
"U.N. Chronicle 18 (March 1980).
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would have imposed mandatory economic sanctions against Iran for its
refusal to release the hostages. There is also evidence that Soviet broadcasts into Iran spoke sympathetically of the hostage taking and, at the time
the final agreement regarding release of the hostages was being negotiated
between the United States and Iran, alleged that the United States intended
to invade Iran and cared nothing for the fate of the hostages."
A major difficulty in evaluating Soviet practice with respect to international terrorism is the problem of defining "state support of international
terrorism." The U.S. Congress has wrestled with this problem. In draft
legislation not yet enacted into law,45 Congress has provided that state support of international terrorism consists of any of the following acts committed deliberately by the state:
(1) Furnishing arms, explosives, or lethal substances to individuals, groups, or
organizations with the likelihood that they will be used in the commission of any
act of international terrorism;
(2) Planning, directing, providing training for, or assisting in the execution of
any act of international terrorism;
(3) Providing direct financial support for the commission of any act of international terrorism;
(4) Providing diplomatic facilities intended to aid or abet the commission of
any act of international terrorism; or
(5) Allowing the use of its territory as a sanctuary
from extradition or prosecu4'
tion for any act of international terrorism.
The scope of subparagraph 1 would appear broad enough to cover a variety of situations-most particularly it would appear to cover Soviet furnishing of arms to insurgency groups because of the likelihood that arms
furnished to such groups will be used in at least a few instances to commit
acts of international terrorism. The Department of State, however, has,
until recently, been more cautious in its approach to state support of international terrorism. Only four countries-Libya, Syria, Iraq and South
Yemen-have been identified by the Department
as repeatedly providing
47
support for acts of international terrorism.
VI. Conclusions and Recommendations
The record of the Soviet Union with respect to international terrorismfrom the perspective of those attempting to combat it-is, to understate the
"See World Press Review, March 1981, at 12.
'"The Omnibus Anti-terrorism Act of 1979, S. 333.
'Section 5(b), S.333.
"See Enclosure 2, Conclusions with Respect to Criteria, Alternative Means, and Furtherance of
Foreign Policy or International Obligations, with President Carter's letters of December 29,

1979, to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House notifying Congress of the
extension of certain foreign policy controls. 123 CONO. REc. H380 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1980) at
H381. On December 31, 1980, President Carter extended the foreign policy controls with
respect to states deemed to be supporting international terrorism. See BNA International
Trade Reporter's U.S. Export Weekly, No. 339, Jan. 6, 1981, at A-10.
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matter, far from satisfactory. The proposition that the Soviet Union is the
foremost supporter of international terrorism is more questionable.
Perhaps the most one can conclude from a review of the record to date is
that the Soviet Union has directly or indirectly supported acts of international terrorism when it has served its interests as it perceives them. Thus
the Soviet Union has supported insurgency groups espousing communist
doctrine, and members of these groups have at times engaged in terrorism.
Also, the Soviet Union is committing numerous atrocities in Afghanistan
and is stifling domestic dissent by means repressive enough at times to constitute state terrorism. Its "surrogates" Libya, Cuba, Iraq, Syria, South
Yemen and others have trained some free-lance terrorist group members.
One should guard, however, against exaggerating the magnitude of
Soviet support of international terrorism or concluding that the Soviet
Union always perceives its interest to lie in supporting international terrorism. Soviet aircraft and diplomats have been subject to terrorist attack,
and, with the recent increase in right-wing terrorism, one can envision more
terrorist attacks against Soviet personnel and property. 48 Moreover, there
have been recent instances of communist cooperation with Western democracies in combatting international terrorism. In 1978 Bulgaria went so far,
reportedly with Soviet approval, 49 as to allow West German police to enter
its territory, assist in the capture of four West German terrorists, and take
them back to West Germany. In 1973, the United States and Cuba entered
into a memorandum of understanding regarding the hijacking of aircraft
and ships, 50 and have continued to cooperate in this area although the
memorandum formally terminated in 1977, pursuant to Cuba's
denunciation.5
One would hope that it might be possible to convince the Soviet Union
that it is more often in its interest to combat than. to support international
terrorism. In attempting to do this, the United States should employ both
the carrot and the stick.
Public disclosure of Soviet support for insurgency groups in El Salva"'At present the incidence of terrorist attack against the Soviet Union is low. CIA reports
indicate that only about 5%of the victims of terrorism were nationals of the Soviet Union or its
East European allies. N.Y. Times,. Feb. 9, 1981, at A3, col. 4. However, the CIA has also
reported that Soviets abroad continue to be attacked by militant Jewish groups and anti-communist Cuban exiles and that more recently Soviet officials and commercial facilities have
been bombed by Ukrainian exiles and individuals protesting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. CIA National Foreign Assessment Center, Inteinational Terrorism in 1979, 6 (April
1980).
' 9N.Y. Times, July 17, 1978, at Al, col. 5.
'Cuba-United States Memorandum of Understanding on the Hijacking of Aircraft and
Vessels, 68 DEPT. STATE BULL. 260 (1973); 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 370 (1973).
"The Memorandum was denounced by Cuba on the grounds that the United States had
failed to control anti-Castro terrorists who had planted a bomb on a Cuban civilian aircraft.
See Washington Post, Oct. 19, 1976 (editorial), at A18, col. 1. Nonetheless, the hijackers of
U.S. planes to Cuba have continued to face the prospect of extradition to the United States or
prosecution in Cuba. N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1980, at A20, col. 1.
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dor 52 and elsewhere and close scrutiny of the Soviet record regarding international terrorism may prove effective uses of the stick. At the same time,
we should seek, through quiet diplomacy, possible avenues of cooperation
with the Soviet Union in combatting terrorism. The carrot may become an
effective tactic if the Soviet Union begins to perceive that it needs Western
cooperation to minimize the risk of terrorist attack against its own personnel and property. To convince the Soviet Union that its best interest lies in
resisting rather than in supporting international terrorism will require delicate and creative diplomacy. But the future stability and peace of the world
may depend on the success of such an endeavor. It should be remembered
that the assassination in Sarajevo of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his
wife on June 28, 1914, by Serbian terrorists escalated tensions between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, and thus between the Dual Alliance and the
Triple Entente, to the level of war. Current manifestations of international
terrorism have a similar war making potential.

"For the text of the Department of State report on communist support for the insurrection
in El Salvador, see N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1981, at A8, col. 1.

